Win-stay-lose-learn promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game by Liu, Y. et al.
Win-Stay-Lose-Learn Promotes Cooperation in the
Spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
Yongkui Liu1,2,3*, Xiaojie Chen4*, Lin Zhang1, Long Wang5, Matjazˇ Perc6*
1 School of Automation Science and Electrical Engineering, Beihang University, Beijing, China, 2 School of Electronic and Control Engineering, Chang’an University, Xi’an,
China, 3Center for Road Traffic Intelligent Detection and Equipment Engineering, Chang’an University, Xi’an, China, 4 Evolution and Ecology Program, International
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria, 5 State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing,
China, 6 Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, Department of Physics, University of Maribor, Maribor, Slovenia
Abstract
Holding on to one’s strategy is natural and common if the later warrants success and satisfaction. This goes against
widespread simulation practices of evolutionary games, where players frequently consider changing their strategy even
though their payoffs may be marginally different than those of the other players. Inspired by this observation, we introduce
an aspiration-based win-stay-lose-learn strategy updating rule into the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game. The rule is simple
and intuitive, foreseeing strategy changes only by dissatisfied players, who then attempt to adopt the strategy of one of
their nearest neighbors, while the strategies of satisfied players are not subject to change. We find that the proposed win-
stay-lose-learn rule promotes the evolution of cooperation, and it does so very robustly and independently of the initial
conditions. In fact, we show that even a minute initial fraction of cooperators may be sufficient to eventually secure a highly
cooperative final state. In addition to extensive simulation results that support our conclusions, we also present results
obtained by means of the pair approximation of the studied game. Our findings continue the success story of related win-
stay strategy updating rules, and by doing so reveal new ways of resolving the prisoner’s dilemma.
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Introduction
Evolutionary game theory provides a powerful mathematical
framework for studying the emergence and stability of cooperation in
social, economic and biological systems [1–5]. The prisoner’s
dilemma game, in particular, is frequently considered as a paradigm
for studying the emergence of cooperation among selfish and
unrelated individuals [6]. The outcome of the prisoner’s dilemma
game is governed by pairwise interactions, such that at any instance
of the game two individuals, who can either cooperate or defect, play
the game against each other by selecting their strategy simulta-
neously and without knowing what the other player has chosen. Both
players receive the reward R upon mutual cooperation, but the
punishment P upon mutual defection. If one player defects while the
other cooperates, however, the cooperator receives the sucker’s
payoff S while the defector receives the temptation T~b. Since
TwRwPwS, there is an innate tension between individual
interests (the rational strategy, yielding an optimal outcome for the
player regardless of what the other player chooses, is defection) and
social welfare (for the society as a whole the optimal strategy is
cooperation) that may result in the ‘‘tragedy of the commons’’ [7].
Five prominent rules for the successful evolution of cooperation,
which may help avert an impeding social decline, are kin selection,
direct and indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity as well as group
selection, as comprehensively reviewed in [8].
Since the pioneering work of Nowak and May [9] spatial games
have received ample attention, and they have become inspirational
for generations of researchers trying to reveal new ways by means of
which cooperation can prevail over defection [10–12]. In the
context of spatial games, network topology and hierarchies have
been identified as a crucial determinant for the success of
cooperative behavior [13–28], where in particular the scale-free
topology has proven very beneficial for the evolution of cooperation.
In fact, payoff normalization [29–31] and conformity [32] belong to
the select and very small class of mechanisms that can upset the
success of cooperators on such highly heterogeneous networks.
Other approaches facilitating the evolution of cooperation include
the introduction of noise to payoffs and updating rules [33–38],
asymmetry between interaction and replacement graphs [39,40],
diversity [41–44], differences between time scales of game dynamics
[44–47], as well as adoption of simultaneous different strategies
against different opponents [48]. Somewhat more personally-
inspired features supporting the evolution of cooperation involve
memory effects [49], heterogeneous teaching activity [50–52],
preferential learning [53,54], mobility [55–59], myopically selective
interactions [60], and coevolutionary partner choice [61–63], to
name but a few examples studied in recent years.
Regardless of the details of mechanisms that may promote the
evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game,
most frequently, it was assumed that individual players learn from
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their neighbors to update their strategies, and that they do so more
or less in every round of game. But in reality, we are much less
prone to changing our strategy (see [64] and references therein).
Withstanding ample trial and error, only when we feel to a
sufficiently high degree unsuccessful and dissatisfied may we be
tempted into altering it. Enter aspirations, which play a pivotal
role in determining our satisfaction and the notion of personal
success. Indeed, the subtle role of aspirations in evolutionary
games has recently received a lot of attention [65–73], and
amongst others, it was discovered that too high aspirations may act
detrimental on the evolution of cooperation. This result is quite
intuitive, as very high aspirations will inevitably lead players to
choose defection over cooperation in order to achieve their high
goals. Regardless of the level, however, aspiration provides an
elegant means to define when a player is prone to changing its
strategy and when not. In particular, if the performance trails
behind the aspiration, then the player will likely attempt to change
its strategy. On the other hand, if the performance agrees or is
even better than the aspiration, then the player will not attempt to
change its strategy. Here we make use of this simple and intuitive
rationale to build on the seminal works that introduced and
studied the win-stay-like (win-stay-lose-shift being the most
prominent example) strategy updating rules [74–76].
In this paper, we thus introduce a so-called win-stay-lose-learn
strategy updating rule as follows. When satisfied, players maintain
their strategies and do not attempt to change them. When
dissatisfied, however, players proceed as it is traditionally assumed,
i.e., by attempting to imitate the strategy of one of their neighbors
[77]. It is worth pointing out that since in evolutionary games on
structured populations individuals need to interact with their
neighbors for collecting payoffs, it can be assumed that such an
interaction mode provides enough opportunities for players to
observe the information of their neighbors (including payoffs).
Nevertheless, it is difficult to pinpoint whether our model can be
held accountable only for human behavior or also for animal
behavior. Certainly, some level of intelligence is needed by the
players to accommodate our assumptions. In the proposed model
the strategy updating is thus conditional on whether the players
are satisfied or not, which we determine by means of the aspiration
level Aw0 that is considered as a free parameter. We note again
that the majority of previous studies assumed that players will
always try and adopt the strategy of one of their neighbors, even if
the neighbor is performing worse, and regardless of the individual
level of satisfaction. Here we depart from this somewhat
simplifying assumption, and by doing so discover that the
aspiration-based conditional strategy updating, termed win-stay-
lose-learn, strongly promotes the evolution of cooperation in the
spatial prisoner’s dilemma game, even under very unfavorable
initial conditions [78,79] and by high temptations to defect b. All
the details of the proposed win-stay-lose-learn strategy updating
rule and the setup of the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game are
described in the Methods section, while here we proceed with
presenting the main results.
Results
We start by presenting the results as obtained when the
cooperators and defectors are distributed uniformly at random,
each thus initially occupying half of the square lattice. As the main
parameters, we consider the aspiration level A and the temptation
to defect b. Figure 1 shows the fraction of cooperators rC as a
function of the temptation to defect b for different aspiration levels
A. We find that the aspiration level has a significant influence on
the density of cooperators. In particular, for small values of A,
intermediate levels of cooperation are maintained, and the
temptation to defect has no effect on cooperation, e.g., for A~0
and A~0:2, rC~0:5 and rC~0:47, respectively, irrespective of
the value of b. When A is within an intermediate range, the
density of cooperators increases with increasing A, however, the
maximal value of b still warranting high cooperation levels
becomes smaller, e.g., when A~0:4, rC~0:7 for b[½0,1:6 and
when A~0:6, rC?1:0 for b[½0,1:2. In addition, as b increases,
transitions to different stationary states can be observed for certain
values of A. Notable examples occur at b~1:6 for A~0:4 and at
b~1:2 for A~0:6, which will be explained below. When A~0:8,
cooperation cannot evolve even if the value of b is only slightly
larger than 1:0. When A~2:0, the result coincides with that for
A~0:8. It is worth pointing out that, in fact, when A is large, e.g.,
A~2:0, individuals are always dissatisfied (as shown below), and
that then our model recovers the traditional version of the
prisoner’s dilemma game. By comparing the results for A~2:0
and those for other values of A, as shown in Fig. 1, we find that the
present updating rule can effectively facilitate the evolution of
cooperation. In particular, when A§2:0, cooperators can survive
only if bv1:05. By contrast, with win-stay-lose-learn updating,
cooperators can not only survive but also thrive even for much
larger values of b.
Figure 1. Win-stay-lose-learn promotes the evolution of cooperation, especially if intermediate aspirations determine the
satisfiability of players. Presented is the stationary fraction of cooperators rC in dependence on the temptation to defect b for different values of
the aspiration A, as obtained by means of simulations (panel a) and the pair approximation (panel b). By comparing the results presented in the two
panels, it can be observed that the pair approximation is to a large degree successful in reproducing the qualitative features of the simulations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030689.g001
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The results obtained by means of pair approximation are
presented in Fig. 1(b). It can be observed that the pair
approximation can qualitatively correctly predict the cooperation
level, especially for small values of A. For example, the result for
A~0:0 is exactly the same as the simulation result. The transition
at A~0:4 can be observed in Fig. 1(b). On the other hand, when
Aw0:5, the satisfaction of individuals is increasingly difficult to
achieve such that individuals tend to learn their neighbors when
updating strategies, and the current model approaches the model
of continuous updating [53]. Hence, there exist some differences
between the results obtained by means of simulations and the pair
approximation. Despite this, in general the results of the pair
approximation support the main conclusions at which we arrive at
by means of simulations.
In order to obtain a more complete picture about the joint
effects of the aspiration level and the temptation to defect, we show
the simulation results as a function of both A and b, as shown in
Fig. 2. The results are consistent with those presented in Fig. 1(a),
e.g., when Aƒ0:25, an intermediate level of cooperation
(rC&0:5) is maintained, irrespective of the value of b. Within
the interval of 0:25vAv0:5, the cooperation level is higher than
that for Aƒ0:25 and the transition can be observed at a fixed
value of b for each value of A. It is interesting that the highest
levels of cooperation occur within the interval of 0:5ƒAv0:75.
Moreover, it can be observed that as A increases, discontinuous
transitions occur at A~0:0, 0:25, 0:5 and 0:75.
These transitions can be understood as follows. On a square
lattice with nearest neighbor interactions, the payoffs of a
cooperator and a defector are given by n1Rzn2S and
n3Tzn4P, respectively, where nk[f0,1,2,3,4g, and k[f1,2,3,4g.
Given that T~b, R~1, and P~S~0, the above payoffs can be
simplified as n1 and n3b, respectively. In our model, when an
individual is dissatisfied, it will learn a randomly chosen neighbor,
which may lead to the change of rC . For a cooperator, when
n1v4A, it is dissatisfied. While for a defector, the condition for its
dissatisfaction is n3bv4A. The phase transition points can be
obtained by letting n1~4A and n3b~4A. Thus, the value of A at
which phase transition occurs is given by A~n1=4 and that for b is
given by b~(4A)=n3w1. Considering all the possible values of n1,
that is n1~0, 1, 2, 3 and 4, we can obtain the phase transition
points of A, which are A~0:0, 0:25, 0:5, 0:75 and 1:0, as shown in
Fig. 2. (As a matter of fact, A~1:0 is also a phase transition point,
however, because when A~1:0, the density of cooperators is very
low such that the phase transition phenomenon cannot be
observed). The phase transition points of b can be calculated
similarly, e.g., when n3~1 and A~0:4, the phase transition point
of b is b~1:6, which is verified by our simulation (see Fig. 2).
Since the strategy changes of individual players are determined
by their satisfaction, we proceed with the results on the satisfaction
rates in the population as a function of b for different values of A,
as shown in Fig. 3. A highly cooperative society where each
member is satisfied can be declared as the ultimate goal. If all
members cooperate, then the social welfare will peak. Moreover, if
then every member is satisfied, the society will be stable. We find
from Fig. 3 that, if we regard the present system as a social
prototype, then the optimal situation occurs within the interval of
b[½1:0,1:2 for A~0:6, since it leads to a highly cooperative
society with a high satisfaction rate. For the extreme case of
A~0:0, all individuals are satisfied. On the contrary, at the other
extreme, i.e.,at A~2:0, no individual is ever satisfied. For A~0:2,
even though that more than 90% of individuals are satisfied, the
cooperation level is not high (rC~0:47). This indicates that a large
number of defectors are satisfied by exploiting cooperators. The
obtained result for A~0:2 reveals that a society where each
member has a low aspiration level cannot be cooperative due to an
inherent lack of incentives. When A~0:4, the fraction of satisfied
individuals drops suddenly at b~1:6. When bƒ1:6, nearly 70% of
individuals cooperate and the satisfaction rate is high, which is
more or less a better situation. Whereas bw1:6 results in the low
cooperation level as well as the low satisfaction rate, which is a
society that should be avoided. When A~0:8, few individuals in
the population are satisfied such that almost all individuals seek for
higher payoffs by imitation, and ultimately defection becomes the
Figure 2. Transitions from predominantly defective to pre-
dominantly cooperative states in dependence on the aspira-
tion level A and the temptation to defect b. Presented is the color-
coded (see bar on the right) fraction of cooperators. The multitude of
transitions in the color map points towards a high complexity of the
underlying mechanisms warranting highly cooperative states (see main
text for details).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030689.g002
Figure 3. The fraction of satisfied players decreases with
increasing aspirations. Presented is the fraction of satisfied players in
the population, for which it holds that Pi§Ai , in dependence on the
temptation to defect b for different values of the aspiration A. It is
interesting to observe that for low values of A the fraction of satisfied
players is independent of b, while for intermediate and large values of A
it decreases with increasing b. Also note that for A~0:0 (A~2:0) all (no)
players are satisfied.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030689.g003
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unique choice. This confirms the standard game theoretical result
that, in a society where individuals imitate each other, individual
greediness (characterized by too high aspiration) may hinder the
emergence of cooperation and eventually harm the benefit of each
member of the society.
Because initial conditions are relevant for the evolutionary
success of cooperators in spatial games [78,79], it is also of interest
to test the robustness of the proposed updating rule. We thus
investigate how cooperation evolves under different (adverse)
initial conditions, which are shown in Fig. 4. We first focus on the
initial configuration of cooperators and consider the case of
Fig. 4(a), where only one cooperator exists in the population
initially. For Aw0, the cooperator surely resorts to defection by
imitation because of his dissatisfaction. Hence, a single cooperator
surrounded by defectors cannot survive Aw0. When initially there
are two neighboring cooperators [see Fig. 4(b)], for Aƒ0:25, both
cooperators and defectors at the boundary are satisfied such that
the pattern is stable. However, when 0:25vAƒb=4, defectors are
satisfied but cooperators are not. Thus, cooperators will become
defectors by imitation. When Awb=4, all individuals are
dissatisfied such that all of them imitate neighbors’ strategies.
Since defectors have a higher payoff, cooperators are more likely
to become defectors. Therefore, Aƒ0:25 is needed to make
cooperators survive. When there exist four cooperators in the
population initially, as shown in Fig. 4(c), the pattern is frozen if
Aƒb=4. However, when b=4vAƒ0:5, cooperators can have
advantages over defectors such that they can invade defectors and
dominate the population ultimately, as shown in Fig. 5. This
indicates the relevance of our model since it allows cooperators to
thrive in harsh conditions where there only exist several
cooperators initially. When Aw0:5, cooperators cannot expand
their territories and, at the same time, they confront the intense
invasion by defectors. Eventually cooperators are wiped out from
the population. In this scenario, Aƒ0:5 is needed to maintain the
pattern. This indicates that greediness may be detrimental to the
emergence of cooperation. The more favorable case emerges when
each cooperator has three cooperative neighbors, i.e. the
population is initialized with two neighboring straight lines of
cooperators, as shown in Fig. 4(d). Under these circumstances,
Aƒ0:75 is required for cooperators to maintain strategies, which,
however, does not warrant cooperators to expand territories. In
order to realize the expansion, we need Aƒ0:5. When Aw0:5,
the expansion of areas of cooperators is significantly restrained,
which is demonstrated in Fig. 5. One can find that in order for the
boom of cooperation, cooperators must, first, form clusters, which
Figure 4. Special initial configurations of cooperators reveal
their potential to expand into the territory of defectors. In all
panels the cooperators are depicted blue while defectors are depicted
red. Each small square corresponds to a single player. Denoted values
correspond to the payoffs of individual players, as obtained for the
presented configurations. See also Fig. 5 for related results.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030689.g004
Figure 5. Robustness of the evolution of cooperation under adverse initial conditions. Panel (a) features the time evolution of the fraction
of cooperators for different combinations of A and b, as obtained when using the initial conditions presented in Figs. 4(c) (black solid line) and (d)
(dashed red and dotted blue line). Bottom row features the characteristic snapshots of the spatial grid (cooperators are blue, defectors are red),
corresponding to the black solid line (panel b), the dashed red line (panel c), and the dotted blue line (panel d). It can be observed that cooperators
may significantly outnumber defectors in the stationary state, even if starting from highly unfavorable conditions, as long as the aspirations are
appropriately adjusted.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030689.g005
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ensures they have advantages over defectors in terms of payoffs.
Second, cooperators cannot set their aspirations too high such that
their satisfactions can easily be achieved [80]. Thus, they will hold
their strategies, which is the precondition for the spreading of
strategies. The fulfillment of the above two conditions as well as
the dissatisfaction of defectors leads to the dissemination of the
cooperative strategy in the population.
Lastly, we elaborate on how cooperators can resist the invasion
by defectors. For this purpose, we consider the special initial
conditions depicted in Fig. 6. Focusing first on Fig. 6(a), we find
that when Aw0:75, cooperators are dissatisfied, which can lead to
the extinction of cooperators. The case in Fig. 6(b) is qualitatively
the same, the only difference being that the payoff of each defector
is 3b. In the situation where there exists a square block of four
defectors [Fig. 6(c)], when Aƒ0:75, cooperators can at least
survive. If b=2vAƒ0:75 (bv1:5), cooperators can even invade
the dissatisfied defectors. If bw1:5, cooperators and defectors can
coexist. On the contrary, when Aw0:75, cooperators are doomed
to extinction. The above analysis explains why when Aw0:75,
cooperators cannot flourish. That is, as long as cooperators do not
set their goals too high (too greedy), cooperators can resist the
invasion of defectors [80]. If they can also have higher payoffs than
neighboring defectors, as shown in Figs. 6(c) and (d), then defectors
can be defeated.
Discussion
In summary, we have studied the impact of the win-stay-lose-
learn strategy updating rule on the evolution of cooperation in the
spatial prisoner’s dilemma game. Unlike in the majority of
previous works, in our case the strategy updating is not
unconditional, but rather it depends on the level of satisfaction
of individual players. The latter is determined by the aspiration
level, which we have considered as a free parameter. If the payoff
of a player is equal or higher than its aspiration, it is assumed that
this player is satisfied and that there is thus no immediate need of
changing its strategy. Conversely, if the payoff is lower than the
aspired amount, the player will attempt to adopt the strategy of
one of its nearest neighbors in the hope that it will reach the
desired success. With this setup, we have found that if all players
retain their strategies when being satisfied then the evolution of
cooperation is remarkably facilitated. Especially for intermediate
values of the aspiration parameter, e.g., A~0:6, virtually complete
cooperation dominance can be achieved even for values of the
temptation to defect that significantly exceed 1. This is in sharp
contrast to the results obtained with (too) large aspiration levels,
e.g., A~2:0, where the traditional version of the spatial prisoner’s
dilemma game is essentially fully recovered. The presented results
also indicate that as long as individuals are not too greedy, i.e.,
aspire to modest (honest) incomes, cooperation thrives best, which
is also in agreement with recent results obtained by means of a
different model [80]. Moreover, we have tested the impact of
different initial configurations, in particular such where coopera-
tors initially have an inherent disadvantage over defectors, and we
have discovered that the studied win-stay-lose-learn rule ensures
that cooperators are able to spread even from very small numbers.
In this sense, the proposed rule is very effective in unleashing the
spreading potential of cooperative behavior, which is to some
extent already provided (seeded) by means of spatial reciprocity
[9]. We have also employed the pair approximation method to
support our simulation results with semi-analytical calculations
and to explain the observed transitions to different levels of
cooperation on the square lattice.
It is instructive to discuss the differences between this work and
related previous works [66,67,70–73]. For example, Chen and
Wang [66] investigated a stochastic win-stay-lose-shift (WSLS)
rule, under which dissatisfied individuals switch their strategies to
the opposite one. It was reported that for small values of the
temptation to defect cooperation can be best promoted at
intermediate values of the aspiration level. Moreover, in [67] a
N-person prisoner’s dilemma game in a continuous population
with a time-dependent aspiration level was investigated, while in
[70] each individual had an aspiration-based learning motivation
(which actually can depend directly on the aspiration level
according to the rule of WSLS). It was reported that the results
produced in [70] are similar to those in [66]. In [72] a payoff-
based preferential learning mechanism was investigated (where
individuals with higher payoffs are more likely to be imitated), and
in [73] an aspiration-based preferential learning mechanism was
studied where an individual whose strategy can provide the desired
payoff when being imitated will be imitated also in the next round.
In our model, however, we incorporate individual aspirations into
the traditional imitation rule, and investigate how cooperation
evolves under the aspiration-based conditional learning in the
spatial prisoner’s dilemma game. The proposed rule is simple and
reasonable, and moreover, we show that it is effective and robust
in promoting cooperation. In particular, cooperation can be
maintained (and can even thrive) even under unfavorable initial
conditions.
Our work also has some parallels with other models not
necessarily incorporating aspirations. Namely, the model intro-
duced recently in [81], where inertia was considered as something
that can disable players to actively change their strategies, or with
the early win-stay-lose-shift models [74–76]. Furthermore, it is
possible to relate our work to those considering the importance of
time scales in evolutionary games [44,45,47]. Note that under the
presently introduced win-stay-lose-learn rule, for small values of A,
the strategy transfers are rare and far apart in time. This has
Figure 6. Special initial configurations of defectors reveal their potential to invade cooperators. In all panels the cooperators are
depicted blue while defectors are depicted red. Each small square corresponds to a single player. Denoted values correspond to the payoffs of
individual players, as obtained for the presented configurations (see main text for details).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030689.g006
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similar consequences as when decreasing the strategy-selection
rate [47]. For intermediate aspiration levels, however, we
essentially have a segregated population if judging from individual
satisfaction, i.e., some players are satisfied while others are not.
This in turn implies that different players have different strategy-
selection time scales. Even more importantly, these time scales are
adaptive (they change over time), as players that eventually do
change their strategies may go from being dissatisfied to becoming
satisfied, or vice versa. In this sense, our model introduces different
evolutionary time scales by means of aspiration, which is an
endogenous property of individuals, and in so doing, it also relaxes
the demand for their (the players’) rationality. Note that in our
model, there is frequently no need to compare payoffs with the
neighbors, apart from when approaching the A?2 limit. Lastly,
we hope that this study will enrich our knowledge on how to
successfully resolve the prisoner’s dilemma, and we hope it will
inspire further work along this very interesting and vibrant avenue
of research.
Methods
The spatial prisoner’s dilemma game is staged on a square
lattice of size L|L with periodic boundary conditions. In
accordance with common practice [9], the payoffs are as follows:
T~b is the temptation to defect, R~1 is the reward for mutual
cooperation, while P~S~0 are the punishment for mutual
defection and the sucker’s payoff, respectively, where 1vbv2.
Although this formulation of the game has P~S rather than
PwS, it captures succinctly the essential social dilemma, and
accordingly, the presented results can be considered fully relevant
and without loss of generality with respect to more elaborated
formulations of the payoffs. Moreover, each player i has an
aspiration level Ai~kiA, where ki is the player’s degree and A is a
free parameter that determines the overall aspiration level of the
population, which is typically constrained to the interval 0vAvb.
Since we consider the square lattice as the interaction network, we
have ki~k~4, which in turn postulates that each player in this
study has an equal aspiration equal to kA.
Player i acquires its payoff Pi by playing the game with its four
nearest neighbors. A randomly selected nearest neighbor j
acquires its payoff Pj likewise by playing the game with its four
nearest neighbors. If Pi§Ai, i.e., if the payoff of player i is equal
or higher than its aspiration, then strategy adoption from player j
is not attempted. If, however, PivAi, then player i adopts the
strategy of player j with the probability
W~
1
1zexp½(Pi{Pj)=k ð1Þ
where k determines the amplitude of noise [33], accounting for
imperfect information and errors in decision making. It is well-
known that there exists an optimal intermediate value of k at
which the evolution of cooperation is most successful [34,35], yet
in general the outcome of the prisoner’s dilemma game is robust to
variations of k. Without much loss of generality, we use k~0:1,
meaning that it is very likely that the better performing players will
pass their strategy to other players, yet it is not impossible that
players will occasionally learn also from the less successful
neighbors. The simulations of this spatial prisoner’s dilemma
game were performed by means of a synchronous updating rule,
using L~100 to 400 system size and discarding the transient times
prior to reaching the stationary states before recording the average
fraction of cooperators rC in the population. We have verified that
the presented results are robust to variations of the system size, and
to the variation of the simulation procedure (e.g., by using random
rather than synchronous updating). It is also worth noting that
because Avb and bv2, the present definition of the win-stay-
lose-learn transforms to the traditional spatial prisoner’s dilemma
game when A§2:0, given that then individual cannot be satisfied
and thus attempt to change their strategy whenever they receive a
chance to do so.
In addition to the simulation results of the proposed spatial
game, we also present the results of pair approximation [53,82–85]
that are obtained with the rate equations of cooperator-cooperator
(c,c) and cooperator-defector (c,d) edges, which are as follows:
_pc,c~
X
x,y,z
½nc(x,y,z)z1pd,xpd,ypd,z|
X
u,v,w
pc,upc,vpc,wf ½Pd (x,y,z),Pc(u,v,w)
{
X
x,y,z
nc(x,y,z)pc,xpc,ypc,z|
X
u,v,w
pd,upd,vpd,wf ½Pc(x,y,z),Pd (u,v,w),
ð2Þ
_pc,d~
X
x,y,z
½1{nc(x,y,z)pd,xpd,ypd,z|
X
u,v,w
pc,upc,vpc,wf ½Pd (x,y,z),Pc(u,v,w)
{
X
x,y,z
½2{nc(x,y,z)pc,xpc,ypc,z|
X
u,v,w
pd,upd,vpd,wf ½Pc(x,y,z),Pd (u,v,w),
ð3Þ
where x,y,z are either cooperators or defectors and nc(x,y,z)
denote the number of cooperators among x,y,z. Moreover,
f (Pi,Pj)~
1
1zexp½(Pi{Pj)=k , PivAi
0, Pi§Ai
8<
: ð4Þ
where Pi and Pj are the payoffs of the two neighboring players i
and j, respectively, and Ai is the payoff aspiration of player i (equal
to Ak for all i). By performing the numerical integration for the
above two differential equations (2,3), and by using pc,d~pd,c and
pc,czpc,dzpd,czpd,d~1, we can obtain rC from pc,czpc,d .
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: YL XC LZ LW MP. Performed
the experiments: YL XC LZ LW MP. Analyzed the data: YL XC LZ LW
MP. Contributed reagents/materials/analysis tools: YL XC LZ LW MP.
Wrote the paper: YL XC LZ LW MP.
References
1. Maynard Smith J (1982) Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
2. Sigmund K (1993) Games of Life: Exploration in Ecology, Evolution and
Behavior. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Win-Stay-Lose-Learn Promotes Cooperation
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 February 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 2 | e30689
3. Hofbauer J, Sigmund K (1998) Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
4. Nowak MA (2006) Evolutionary Dynamics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
5. Sigmund K (2010) The Calculus of Sel¯shness. Princeton, MA: Princeton
University Press.
6. Axelrod R (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
7. Hardin G (1968) The tragedy of the commons. Science 162: 1243–1248.
8. Nowak MA (2006) Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science 314:
1560–1563.
9. Nowak MA, May RM (1992) Evolutionary games and spatial chaos. Nature 359:
826–829.
10. Szabo´ G, Fa´th G (2007) Evolutionary games on graphs. Phys Rep 446: 97–216.
11. Roca CP, Cuesta JA, Sa´nchez A (2009) Evolutionary game theory: Temporal
and spatial effects beyond replicator dynamics. Phys Life Rev 6: 208–249.
12. Perc M, Szolnoki A (2010) Coevolutionary games – a mini review. BioSystems
99: 109–125.
13. Santos FC, Pacheco JM (2005) Scale-free networks provide a unifying
framework for the emergence of cooperation. Phys Rev Lett 95: 098104.
14. Vukov J, Szabo´ G (2005) Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on hierarchical
lattices. Phys Rev E 71: 036133.
15. Santos FC, Pacheco JM, Lenaerts T (2006) Evolutionary dynamics of social
dilemmas in structured heterogeneous populations. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA
103: 3490–3494.
16. Santos FC, Rodrigues JF, Pacheco JM (2006) Graph topology plays a
determinant role in the evolution of cooperation. Proc R Soc B 273: 51–55.
17. Go´mez-Garde,nes J, Campillo M, Moreno Y, Florı´a LM (2007) Dynamical
organization of cooperation in complex networks. Phys Rev Lett 98: 108103.
18. Poncela J, Go´mez-Garden˜es J, Florı´a LM, Moreno Y (2007) Robustness of
cooperation in the evolu- tionary prisoner’s dilemma on complex systems.
New J Phys 9: 184.
19. Lozano S, Arenas A, Sa´nchez A (2008) Mezoscopic structure conditions the
emergence of cooperation on social networks. PLoS ONE 3: e1892.
20. Poncela J, Go´mez-Garden˜es J, Florı´a LM, Sa´nchez A, Moreno Y (2008)
Complex cooperative networks from evolutionary preferential attachment. PLoS
ONE 3: e2449.
21. Poncela J, Go´mez-Garden˜es J, Florı´a LM, Moreno Y, Sa´nchez A (2009)
Cooperative scale-free networks despite the presence of defector hubs. EPL 88:
38003.
22. Poncela J, Go´mez-Garden˜es J, Traulsen A, Moreno Y (2009) Evolutionary game
dynamics in a growing structured population. New J Phys 11: 083031.
23. Pacheco JM, Pinheiro FL, Santos FC (2009) Population structure induces a
symmetry breaking favoring the emergence of cooperation. PLoS Comput Biol
5.
24. Grujic´ J, Fosco C, Araujo L, Cuesta JA, Sa´nchez A (2010) Social experiments in
the mesoscale: Humans playing a spatial prisoner’s dilemma. PLoS ONE 5:
e13749.
25. Dai Q, Li H, Cheng H, Li Y, Yang J (2010) Double-dealing behavior potentially
promotes cooperation in evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games. New J Phys 12:
113015.
26. Poncela J, Go´mez-Garden˜es J, Moreno Y (2011) Cooperation in scale-free
networks with limited associative capacities. Phys Rev E 83: 057101.
27. Lee S, Holme P, Wu ZX (2011) Emergent hierarchical structures in
multiadaptive games. Phys Rev Lett 106: 028702.
28. Dai Q, Cheng H, Li H, Li Y, Zhang M, et al. (2011) Crossover between
structured and well-mixed networks in an evolutionary prisoners dilemma game.
Phys Rev E 84: 011103.
29. Tomassini M, Luthi L, Pestelacci E (2007) Social dilemmas and cooperation in
complex networks. Int J Mod Phys C 18: 1173–1185.
30. Wu ZX, Guan JY, Xu XJ, Wang YH (2007) Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma
game on Baraba´si-Albert scale-free networks. Physica A 379: 672–680.
31. Szolnoki A, Perc M, Danku Z (2008) Towards effective payoffs in the prisoner’s
dilemma game on scale-free networks. Physica A 387: 2075–2082.
32. Pen˜a J, Volken H, Pestelacci E, Tomassini M (2009) Conformity hinders the
evolution of cooperation on scale-free networks. Phys Rev E 80: 016110.
33. Szabo´ G, To˝ke C (1998) Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on a square
lattice. Phys Rev E 58: 69–73.
34. Szabo´ G, Vukov J, Szolnoki A (2005) Phase diagrams for an evolutionary
prisoner’s dilemma game on two-dimensional lattices. Phys Rev E 72: 047107.
35. Perc M (2006) Coherence resonance in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game.
New J Phys 8: 22.
36. Vukov J, Szabo´ G, Szolnoki A (2006) Cooperation in the noisy case: Prisoner’s
dilemma game on two types of regular random graphs. Phys Rev E 73: 067103.
37. Szolnoki A, Vukov J, Szabo´ G (2009) Selection of noise level in strategy adoption
for spatial social dilemmas. Phys Rev E 80: 056112.
38. Szabo´ G, Szolnoki A, Vukov J (2009) Selection of dynamical rules in spatial
prisoner’s dilemma games. EPL 87: 18007.
39. Ohtsuki H, Nowak MA, Pacheco JM (2007) Breaking the symmetry between
interaction and replacement in evolutionary dynamics on graphs. Phys Rev Lett
98: 108106.
40. Ohtsuki H, Pacheco JM, Nowak MA (2007) Evolutionary graph theory:
Breaking the symmetry between interaction and replacement. J Theor Biol 246:
681–694.
41. Hu MB, Jiang R, Wu QS, Wu YH (2007) Simulating the wealth distribution
with a richest-following strategy on scale-free networks. Physica A 381: 467–472.
42. Perc M, Szolnoki A (2008) Social diversity and promotion of cooperation in the
spatial prisoner’s dilemma game. Phys Rev E 77: 011904.
43. Santos FC, Santos MD, Pacheco JM (2008) Social diversity promotes the
emergence of cooperation in public goods games. Nature 454: 213–216.
44. Wu ZX, Rong Z, Holme P (2009) Diversity of reproduction time scale promotes
cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma games. Phys Rev E 80: 036103.
45. Roca CP, Cuesta JA, Sa´nchez A (2006) Time scales in evolutionary dynamics.
Phys Rev Lett 97: 158701.
46. Szolnoki A, Perc M, Danku Z (2008) Making new connections towards
cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game. EPL 84: 50007.
47. Rong Z, Wu ZX, Wang WX (2010) Emergence of cooperation through
coevolving time scale in spatial prisoner’s dilemma. Phys Rev E 82: 026101.
48. Wardil L, Silva JKL (2009) Adoption of simultaneous different strategies against
different opponents enhances cooperation. EPL 86: 38001.
49. Liu Y, Li Z, Chen X, Wang L (2010) Memory-based prisoner’s dilemma on
square lattices. Physica A 389: 2390–2396.
50. Szolnoki A, Szabo´ G (2007) Cooperation enhanced by inhomogeneous activity
of teaching for evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games. EPL 77: 30004.
51. Szolnoki A, Perc M (2008) Coevolution of teaching activity promotes
cooperation. New J Phys 10: 043036.
52. Szabo´ G, Szolnoki A (2009) Cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma with two
types of players for increasing number of neighbors. Phys Rev E 79: 016106.
53. Guan JY, Wu ZX, Huang ZG, Xu XJ, Wang YH (2006) Promotion of
cooperation induced by nonlinear attractive effect in spatial prisoner’s dilemma
game. Europhys Lett 76: 1214–1220.
54. Wu ZX, Xu XJ, Huang ZG, Wang SJ, Wang YH (2006) Evolutionary prisoner’s
dilemma game with dynamic preferential selection. Phys Rev E 74: 021107.
55. Vainstein MH, Silva ATC, Arenzon JJ (2007) Does mobility decrease
cooperation? J Theor Biol 244: 722–728.
56. Helbing D, Yu W (2009) The outbreak of cooperation among success-driven
individuals under noisy conditions. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 106: 3680–3685.
57. Meloni S, Buscarino A, Fortuna L, Frasca M, Gomez-Garden˜es J, et al. (2009)
Effects of mobility in a population of prisoner’s dilemma players. Phys Rev E 79:
067101.
58. Droz M, Szwabinski J, Szabo´ G (2009) Motion of influential players can support
cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma. Eur Phys J B 71: 579–585.
59. Wu ZX, Holme P (2009) Effects of strategy-migration direction and noise in the
evolutionary spatial prisoner’s dilemma. Phys Rev E 80: 026108.
60. Chen X, Wang L (2009) Cooperation enhanced by moderate tolerance ranges in
myopically selective interactions. Phys Rev E 80: 046109.
61. Fu F, Hauert C, Nowak MA, Wang L (2008) Reputation-based partner choice
promotes cooperation in social networks. Phys Rev E 78: 026117.
62. Fu F, Wu T, Wang L (2009) Partner switching stabilizes cooperation in
coevolutionary prisoner’s dilemma. Phys Rev E 79: 036101.
63. Van Segbroeck S, Santos FC, Lenaerts T, Pacheco JM (2009) Reacting
differently to adverse ties promotes cooperation in social networks. Phys Rev
Lett 102: 058105.
64. Cho IK, Matsui A (2005) Learning aspiration in repeated games. J Econ Theor
124: 171–201.
65. Macy MW, Flache A (2002) Learning dynamics in social dilemmas. Proc Natl
Acad Sci USA 99: 7229–7236.
66. Chen X, Wang L (2008) Promotion of cooperation induced by appropriate
payoff aspirations in a small- world networked game. Phys Rev E 77: 017103.
67. Platkowski T, Bujnowski P (2009) Cooperation in aspiration-based n-person
prisoner’s dilemmas. Phys Rev E 79: 036103.
68. Platkowski T (2009) Enhanced cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma with
aspiration. Appl Math Lett 22: 1161–1165.
69. Yang HX, Wu ZX, Wang BH (2010) Role of aspiration-induced migration in
cooperation. Phys Rev E 81: 065101(R).
70. Zhang H, Small M, Yang H, Wang B (2010) Adjusting learning motivation to
promote cooperation. Physica A 389: 4734–4739.
71. Wang Z, Perc M (2010) Aspiring to the fittest and promotion of cooperation in
the prisoner’s dilemma game. Phys Rev E 82: 021115.
72. Perc M, Wang Z (2011) Heterogeneous aspirations promote cooperation in the
prisoner’s dilemma game. PLoS ONE 5: e15117.
73. Liu Y, Chen X, Wang L, Li B, Zhang W, et al. (2011) Aspiration-based learning
promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma games. EPL 94: 60002.
74. Nowak MA, Sigmund K (1993) A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that
outperforms tit-for-tat in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Nature 364: 56–58.
75. Posch M (1999) Win-stay, lose-shift strategies for repeated games–memory
length, aspiration levels and noise. J Theor Biol 198: 183–195.
76. Imhof LA, Fudenberg D, Nowak MA (2007) Tit-for-tat or win-stay, lose-shift?
J Theor Biol 247: 574–580.
77. Matsen FA, Nowak MA (2004) Win-stay, lose-shift in language learning from
peers. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 101: 18053–18057.
78. Langer P, Nowak MA, Hauert C (2008) Spatial invasion of cooperation. J Theor
Biol 250: 634–641.
79. Chen X, Fu F, Wang L (2008) Influence of different initial distributions on
robust cooperation in scale- free networks: A comparative study. Phys Lett A
372: 1161–1167.
80. Roca CP, Helbing D (2011) Emergence of social cohesion in a model society of
greedy, mobile individuals. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 108: 11370–11374.
Win-Stay-Lose-Learn Promotes Cooperation
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 February 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 2 | e30689
81. Liu RR, Rong Z, Jia CX, Wang BH (2010) Effects of diverse inertia on scale-
free-networked prisoner’s dilemma games. EPL 91: 20002.
82. Hauert C, Doebeli M (2004) Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of
cooperation in the snowdrift game. Nature 428: 643–646.
83. Hauert C, Szabo´ G (2005) Game theory and physics. Am J Phys 73: 405–414.
84. Wu ZX, Wang YH (2007) Cooperation enhanced by the difference between
interaction and learning neighborhoods for evolutionary spatial prisoner’s
dilemma games. Phys Rev E 75: 041114.
85. Chen X, Fu F, Wang L (2008) Interaction stochasticity supports cooperation in
spatial prisoner’s dilemma. Phys Rev E 78: 051120.
Win-Stay-Lose-Learn Promotes Cooperation
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 February 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 2 | e30689
